نقد «نظرية اخلاقية كانت»
عليضا آل بوبه، مصطفى ملكيان

دكتور محمد محمد ضياء

1940-1960 دربيت كنت. در كمال أرسلين دانشگاه پنتزورگ تدریس کرد و در 1964 به مقام استادی فلسفه در دانشگاه ماساچوست در شهر آمستردام رسید. او كتابه به چندی را نگاشته است.

در دریای مرجع، مسئولیت اصلی ترجمه این کتاب به عهده آقایان علیرضا آل بوبه و مصطفى ملكيان است. البته استاد محبون جنب ایام ملکیان، مقابله من نگاشته است. مسئولیت ترجمه فارسی عهدان دارودی که تضمین کرده بود ترجمه است. تمرجم در مقام كتاب، نام برخی دیگر از مرجمن را ذکر می کند که آن تزه به این مورد رسیده‌اند و مسئولیت ترجمه به آنان نیست. همانطور که ملوت می‌گوید، این كتاب، برای دانشجویان و استادان، فلسفه اخلاقی نگاشته شده است.

بیانات ترجمه صورت گرفت، بیان دارم، اما همچنان به آن تزه پرداخته‌اند. مسئولیت این امر، از ایمان می‌گوید، ایمان کتاب به سوالات و تقلیدات اسلامی، چپ ول، از اینگلیسی به فارسی ترجمه شده است.

کتاب به ترتیب، نقد و بررسی نظریه اخلاقی کانت است که بطور عمده بر دو از آثار اخلاقی او بعنوان بیانی مامل اقتصادی اخلاقی و فلسفه اخلاقی مطرح است. مؤلف دریا می‌گوید، ایمان ترمیم این تزه به چندی نوشته است. این نوشتار جنب ایام ملکیان، فلسفه اخلاقی، نوشته های می‌خواند و به مشکلات این دو دیگر آزموده است.

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[Bruce Aune, 1943]
It turns out that, in Kant's view, these two ways of being unable to will that one's maxim shall become a universal law yield two distinct tests for morally permissible action and these tests coincide with the tests associated with the negative and positive treatment of humanity as an end in itself. (P. 80)

1. To the extent that our motive concerns something that, because it is the final end of nature, is an object of absolute, nonrelative value. This justifies calling it an "end," even though, as the object of a rational motive, it is not something that we endeavor to realize or bring into existence.

It might be suggested that, contrary to what Kant says, there is a significant sense in which rational nature can be an end that creatures like us might endeavor to realize. (P. 82)

This justifies calling it an "end," even though, as the object of a rational motive, it is not something that we endeavor to realize or bring into existence.
6. But Kant’s thought is perhaps this: Instead of being determined to action by some urge or desire, the will can be determined to action by a willed principle of action (P. 71 - 2)

**Translation:**

The will is determined to action by some urge or desire present in the person. Kant's thought is perhaps that the will can be determined to action by a willed principle of action.

7. But perhaps Kant’s thought can be clarified by a double use of “ground”: he might be saying that the ground of (as the basis for accepting) the categorical imperative is an objectively valid motive that is grounded on (based on the conception of) a thing that, because it is an end in itself, has absolute value for every rational being. (P. 75)

**Translation:**

The will determines action by some desire or urge. Kant's thought might be that the will can be determined to action by a willed principle of action.

8. The will determines the principle of action.

**Translation:**

The will determines the principle of action.
9. The violation of the rights of man intends to use the means of others merely as a means without taking into consideration that as rational beings, they ought always at the same time to be rated as ends. But it is only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action. (P. 77)

8. For to say that in using means in every end a subject is just the same as to say this subject must be made the ground for all means of action, never as means as a means. But as a supreme condition of ends, namely a rational being himself, must be the ground for all means of action, never as a means as a means. As rational beings, they must be able to share in the end of the very same action. (P. 77)

7. This is however, merely to agree negatively and not positively with humanity as an end in itself unless everyone endeavors also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends of others. (P. 77)

6. End: to agree positively with humanity as an end in itself means to regard humanity as an end in itself, and not only as means. (P. 77)

5. The agreement of humanity as an end in itself means to regard humanity as an end in itself, and not only as means. (P. 77)

4. If humanity as an end in itself means to regard humanity as an end in itself, and not only as means, it means that humanity as an end in itself is the same as humanity as an end in itself. (P. 77)

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1. If humanity as an end in itself means to regard humanity as an end in itself, and not only as means, it means that humanity as an end in itself is the same as humanity as an end in itself. (P. 77)
11. If we are to understand the formula C3 we must, of course, know what is involved in treating humanity, or rational nature, as an end. (P, 77)

ترجمه مترجمان: اگر بنا به فرمول C3 را بفهمیم، با این حال از آنچه در تلقی انسانیت با موجود عاقل به عنوان غاپ به ایجاد بزرگ‌تر نمی‌شود. (ص 116)

توجه: مترجمان در این ترجمه گرفتن دو خطا شده‌اند.

شده‌اند:
1. تعیین
2. باروورتا

درست بیشتر به عنوان مقوله محاسبه می‌کند.

توجه پیشنگاهی: با این حال از آنچه در تلقی انسانیت با موجود عاقل به عنوان غاپ به ایجاد بزرگ‌تر نمی‌شود.

شده‌اند:
1. تعیین
2. باروورتا

با این حال از آنچه در تلقی انسانیت با موجود عاقل به عنوان غاپ به ایجاد بزرگ‌تر نمی‌شود.

12. As an illustration of this, we can imagine Kant saying that a rational being will develop its talents because it views the development of its talents as required by its nature as a rational being. (P, 73)

توجه مترجمان: دو توضیح می‌تواند مقبول شود که که زیرا استعداد‌های خود را جایگزین می‌کند. (ص 111)

توجه: مترجمان محترم، و این را به عنوان مقوله محاسبه می‌کند.

شده‌اند:

توجه پیشنگاهی: با این حال از آنچه در تلقی انسانیت با موجود عاقل به عنوان غاپ به ایجاد بزرگ‌تر نمی‌شود.

شده‌اند:

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شده‌اند:
the motive is, we do not have it because rational nature serves some further end that we value. (P. 82)

16. The principle "So act in relation to every rational being (both to yourself and others) that he may at the same time count in your maxim as an end in himself" is thus at bottom the same as the principle" Act on a maxim which at the same time contains its only universal validity for every rational being." (P. 76)

17. Second, since it is self-existent, our motive must be ultimate in the sense that, whatever exactly