Qabasat

Qabasat

A Comparative Study of the Symmetry Problem of Evil from Tully and Plantinga's Point of View

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
1 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Farabi School, University of Tehran
2 Doctoral student of Philosophy of Religion, Farabi School, University of Tehran
11001
Abstract
In the symmetry problem of evil, the multiplicity and intensity of evil are used as evidence against the existence of God. According to this, there are terrible evils in the world that an all-knowing, omnipotent and pure good being could prevent, without losing a greater good or allowing a greater or equal evil, but he did not do so; So, the greater the severity and diversity of this evil, the less the possibility of the existence of a pure good God who is all-knowing and Omnipotent. Michael Tolley believes in the problem of symmetry of evil. He believes in the improbability of God's existence by relying on premises such as the plurality of evil, examining the possibilities of the theory of God's existence in comparison with alternative theories, and citing the Lisbon earthquake as the main argument. On the other hand, Alvin Plantinga, in response to Tully, relying on premises such as that theism is the most probable option, because its alternative theories have serious problems, by criticizing two of the premises of Tully's main argument, seeks to prove the existence of God. In this article, an attempt has been made to explain Tully and Plantinga's argument by relying on the library method and then presenting other criticisms of Tully's probability theory.
Keywords

  1. ابن‌سینا، ح. ب. (1404ق). الالهیات- الشفاء. قم: کتابخانه عمومی آیت‌الله‌ مرعشی نجفیŠ.
  2. اترک، ح. (1389). وظیفه‌گرایی اخلاقی. اخلاق در علوم و فناوری.بهار و تابستان 1389 شماره 1 و 2
  3. پترسون، م.، هاسکر، و.، رایشنباخ، ب.، و بازینجر، د. (۱۳۸۸). عقل و اعتقاد دینی. ترجمه ا. نراقی، و ا. سلطانی، تهران، طرح نو.
  4. پورمحمدی، ن. (زمستان 1392). پاسخ به مسئله اگزیستانسی شر در الهیات مسیحی. جستارهای فلسفه دین، زمستان 1392 - شماره 6، 19-38.
  5. سعیدی مهر، م. (تابستان 1388 ). حکمت الاهی و مسئله قرینه‌ای شر. قبسات، 14 (52).
  6. طباطبایی، س. م. (1384). نهایة الحکمة. قم، مؤسسة النشر الإسلامی.
  7. فارابی (1408 ق). التعلیقات. بیروت: دار المناهل.
  8. مطهری، م. (1389). عدل الهی. تهران: صدرا.
  9. مطهری، م.، و طباطبایی، س. (1390). اصول فلسفه و روش رئالیسم. ج5. تهران: صدرا.
  10. Clark, K. J. (1990). Return To Reason. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
  11. craig, e. (2005). the shorter routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. New York: Routledge.
  12. Darwin, C. (1881). Darwin Correspondence Project. Retrieved from University of Cambridge.
  13. Howard-Snyder, D. (1996). The Evidential Argument From Evil. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
  14. Kvanvig, J. l. (2016). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion vol.7. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  15. Murray, M. J., & Greenberg, S. (2016). Leibniz on the Problem of Evil. Retrieved from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition): https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/leibniz-evil/
  16. Neiman, S. (2001). What’s the Problem of Evil? In M. P. Lara, Rethinking evil : contemporary perspectives. University of California Press.
  17. Neiman, S. (2015). Evil in Modern thought an alternative history of philosophy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
  18. Piantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. New York: Oxford University Press.
  19. Plantinga, A. (2002). the evolutionary argument against naturalism. In J. K. Beilby, Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. London: Cornell University Press.
  20. Plantinga, A., & Tooley, M. (2008). Knowledge of God (Great Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell Publishing.
  21. Pojman, L. P., & Rea, M. (2012). Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology. Cengage Learning.
  22. Tooley, M (2015) The Problem of Evil. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/
  23. Trakakis, N. (n.d.). The Evidential Problem of Evil. Retrieved from internet encyclopedia of philosophy: https://iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/
  24. Walley, p.(1996). Inferences from Multinomial Data: Learning about a Bag of Marbles. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 3-57.