The problem of evil, especially in its logical and evidential (gratuitous) formulations, is a fundamental challenge in philosophy of religion. Drawing on Sadrian transcendental wisdom, this article criticizes their premises. The main novelty is distinguishing ontological evil, a non-existent, relative matter concomitant with existential deficiency never willed by God, from epistemological evil, which appears in perception but is essentially good and termed 'evil' only due to relation to absence. Thus, Sadrians resolve the logical contradiction by analyzing omnipotence (pertaining to possibilities, not impossibilities) and pure benevolence (intending the greater good). Against gratuitous evil, emphasizing the limits of induction and human understanding, they regard evils as necessary byproducts of the causal system of the best order (Nizam-e Ahsan) and continuous emanation. Hence, real gratuitous evil is negated; what seems gratuitous is either our ignorance or an accidental evil preparing superior goods. Consequently, no inherent inconsistency exists between God's attributes and evils; rather, creation is coherent, with evils having a necessary, purposeful place.