The goodness and ugliness of actions have always been cited by theological religions and Muslim thinkers; It's as if Mu'tazila have become the promoters of essential goodness and ugliness, but the Ash'arites have insisted on legitimacy of goodness and ugliness. In addition to these two central views, Ibn Taymiyya al-Ḥarrānī, emphasizing the essential goodness and ugliness, considers it as the third view and contrary to the two views of Mu'tazila and Ash'ari. In this article, an attempt is made to answer the question whether it is possible to accept Ibn Taymiyyah’s claim about the essential goodness and ugliness. In fact, Ibn Taymiyya al-Ḥarrānī, who considers intellectual knowledge to be relative and unbelievable and does not accept it as an independent element in the understanding of facts, tries to distinguish essential goodness and ugliness, he denies essential goodness and ugliness, and emphasizes on the legitimacy of reward and punishment and believes that an action is not worthy of praise and reward, nor is it worthy of ugliness and punishment. He emphasizes that there is no entitlement to human action. In this article, while explaining Ibn Taymiyya’s point of view and critically examining his view on the essence of reason and intellectual knowledge, his depiction of goodness and ugliness in the two issues of denying essential goodness and ugliness and his emphasis on the legitimacy of rewards and punishment are reviewed and criticized, a view that can be considered a corrected approach.