چکیده مبسوط

Extended Abstract

1) Introduction

In contemporary philosophy of mind, the problem of personal identity is primarily discussed in terms of three theories: memory-based (John Locke, Derek Parfit), body-based or animalism (Eric Olson), and narrative-based (Marya Schechtman). Each of these approaches attempts to provide a clear criterion for the persistence of the person over time. However, these theories usually confine themselves to the psychological, biological, or narrative level and pay less attention to the ontological, moral, and eschatological dimensions of human identity. In the Islamic philosophical tradition, especially in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy (al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah) and the thought of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī, personal identity is explained in connection with bodily resurrection based on principles such as substantial motion (al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyyah), the union of soul and body (ittiḥād al-nafs wa al-badan), the embodiment of deeds (tajassum al-aʿmāl), and divine justice. The main question of this research is whether the three mechanisms of memory, body, and narrative can be redefined within the framework of Islamic philosophy to achieve a more comprehensive explanation of personal identity – one that is both compatible with philosophical reason and covers the teachings of resurrection.

2) Methodology 

This research employs a qualitative-analytical method with a comparative approach. Data have been collected from primary sources, including the major works of Mullā Ṣadrā (al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah, al-Mabdaʾ wa al-Maʿād) and Zunūzī (Badāʾiʿ al-Ḥikam), as well as the foundational texts of contemporary philosophy of mind (works of Locke, Parfit, Olson, Schechtman). Data analysis was conducted through content analysis and the comparison of key concepts (memory, body, narrative) between the two intellectual traditions. In addition, the functionalist approach in philosophy of mind has been employed as an interdisciplinary framework to assess the relationships among the psychological, biological, and narrative functions of identity against the ontological foundations of Islamic philosophy.

3) Discussion and Findings 

The findings of the research can be categorized into three main axes:

First, memory and personal identity: In memory-based theory, the continuity of consciousness through causal links between past and present experiences is the basis of identity. But in Ṣadrā’s philosophy, memory is not the cause; rather, it is a sign and manifestation of the soul’s existential continuity in the course of substantial motion. The rational soul (al-nafs al-nāṭiqah), in its intensifying existence, preserves all perceptions and actions in a presentational (ḥuḍūrī) and existential manner. Hence, “recollection” is a reflection of “being,” not a factor that reconstructs identity.

Second, body and personal identity: Animalism (body-based theory) regards the continuity of the biological organism as the main condition for identity. However, Zunūzī – unlike Mullā Ṣadrā who considers the otherworldly body to be an imaginal (mithālī) body arising from the embodiment of deeds – insists on the return of “the very same natural body of this world” in the resurrection. In his view, divine justice requires that the same body from which actions issued should also receive reward or punishment. From this perspective, the natural body is not merely a biological substrate but a “psychic deposit” (wadīʿah nafsāniyyah) and the instrument for realizing moral responsibility. In contrast, Mullā Ṣadrā considers the body to be the lower level of the soul, which in resurrection transforms into an imaginal body. Nevertheless, in both views, the body has an existential function (not merely a biological one).

Third, narrative and personal identity: Narrative theory holds that identity is the product of a person’s ability to construct a coherent story of their own life. In Islamic philosophy, this narrative transcends the mental level and becomes the “embodiment of deeds”: that is, in the resurrection, the person encounters the objectification of all their actions and character traits. Thus, the existential narrative is built in this world and becomes concretely manifested in the next world. Both Mullā Ṣadrā and Zunūzī accept this continuity of the moral narrative, differing only in that Mullā Ṣadrā explains it in the form of the imaginal reality (ḥaqīqat mithālī) and Zunūzī explains it in the form of the re-creation of the natural body.

Functionalism as a theoretical bridge: Functionalism in philosophy of mind explains identity based on the causal role of mental states and distances itself from mere substance-dualism. This approach can enter into dialogue with Islamic philosophy, because in Transcendent Philosophy as well, the soul and body share existential functions. However, Islamic philosophy situates these functions within an ontological hierarchy and with an eschatological end, whereas mainstream functionalism is mostly limited to the empirical and synchronic analysis of functions.

4) Conclusion 

This research shows that the three mechanisms of memory, body, and narrative in contemporary philosophy of mind, each on its own, are insufficient to explain all dimensions of personal identity; but within the framework of Islamic philosophy – and by relying on the principles of substantial motion, embodiment of deeds, and divine justice – they can be recreated in an integrated manner. Mullā Ṣadrā and Zunūzī have defended bodily resurrection through two different strategies (imaginal body versus natural body), and both demonstrate that personal identity is not valid without considering the existential continuity of the soul and the moral realization of actions. Therefore, the interaction between philosophy of mind and Islamic philosophy not only reveals the shortcomings of contemporary theories but also opens a new horizon for anthropology and philosophy of religion, in which memory, body, and narrative are unified in the light of the journey toward God (sayr ilā Allāh).

5) References

Locke, J. (1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (P. H. Nidditch, Ed.). Oxford University Press (Original work published, 1690). https://doi.org/10.1093/oseo/instance.00018020

Olson, E. T. (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195134230.001.0001

Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Ṣ. M. (Mullā Ṣadrā). (1981). Al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah fī al-Asfār al-ʿAqliyyah al-Arbaʿah. Vols. 8-9. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī. [In Arabic]

Schechtman, M. (1996). The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501716454

Schechtman, M. (2014). Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684875.001.0001

Zunūzī, Ā. M. (1999). Majmūʿah- yi muṣannafāt-i ḥakīm-i muʾassis Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī. Vol. 2, ed. M. Kadīvar. Qom: Būstān-i Kitāb. [In Persian].