چکیده مبسوط

Extended Abstract

1) Introduction

The knowledge of the principles of ijtihad teaches rules that can be used in the way of inference. The rational method (= the rational path = the rational way) is one of the most fundamental methods used in acquiring and establishing the principles of ijtihad, as stated in the definition of the science of principles: The science of principles is the same science that discusses the rules established by the rationalists for deducing rulings. However, although the experts of this technique have used reasoning from the way in some cases in their works, this discussion has not been revised as it should be, while it is very much needed in inference, in addition to being one of the evidences of some Emirates. The term “sira” is divided into “sira” and “aqla’iyyah.”

The rational practice (= the rational path) has been defined, including: the continuity of the action of rational people on something because they are rational, whether they are affiliated with a nation and religion or not, and the issue on which the rational path is continuous, whether it is a matter of principles or jurisprudence, or the continuity of the habit and agreement of acting on something or leaving something by all rational people and the general custom of every religion and lineage. Conversely, the “mutshara’iyyah” [= sira” shari’iyyah = sira” islamiyyah] has been defined as: it is the action of Muslims because they are Muslims and are committed to the rules of the Sharia, or it is the continuation of a habit and practical agreement on doing something or leaving something on the example of the Imamiyyah, or it is the general conduct of the religious people in the era of legislation.

2) Methodology

The methodology of the principles of ijtihad is the study, calculation, comparison, measurement and evaluation of the methods used in this knowledge. By examining and evaluating the methods, methodology distinguishes the right path from the wrong path and puts forward. The aim of this article is to explain, analyze, evaluate and examine the “aqla’iyyah” method (sira) and in order to clarify its distinction, it has also referred to the “mutshara’iyyah” method (sira and “sira”).

3) Discussion and Results

The “mutshara’iyyah” method is, by its very nature, habitually born of the Shariah evidence and because it is the revealer of the Shariah evidence, there is no need for an infallible explanation in it. Some are of the opinion that if the continuity of the prescribed way of life is known until the time of the author of the law, it is a proof of his consent, and otherwise, in order to state the truth and explain the elimination of falsehood, it is necessary to prohibit the lawgiver, but the way of life must be from those who adhere to the law and those who believe in it, and what the way of life is based on must be from the matters of prohibition that have the status of being considered by the lawgiver. Some are of the opinion that if it is known in the way of life that it was current in the eras of the Infallibles (AS) and even the Infallibles (AS) were one of the agents of it or its decreers, the way of life is a conclusive proof of the lawgiver’s consent, so it is in itself a proof of the ruling, and if it is not known in the way of life or if the way of life is known to have occurred after the eras of the Infallibles (AS), there is no room for relying on it in discovering the Infallibles’ (AS) consent with certainty. In the practices existing in our times, one cannot be sure and trust that they existed in the early Islamic times, and with doubt in that, it is necessarily more appropriate that they are not proof; because doubt in the validity of a thing is sufficient in the absence of its validity; because there is no proof except knowledge.

The rational practice is not a revealer of the religious statement in the way of discovering the effect from the cause, and it only indicates the religious ruling through the implication of the statement. Therefore, the establishment of the rational practice requires the inclusion of the statement of the lawgiver and his non-prohibition in order for the proof to be the desired one. In a sense, the rational way is valid only after the signature, even if the non-prohibition is due to its pervasiveness. Some are of the opinion that the rational way is due to the nature concentrated in the minds of the rational, according to what God Almighty has deposited in accordance with His perfect wisdom to preserve the order in their nature. If this way continued until the time of the lawgiver and was before the eyes of the lawgiver, and the lawgiver had the ability to prevent their prohibitions and did not prevent them, it would inevitably reveal the definitive consent of the owner of the law in this way, and otherwise he would have prevented that prohibition, and if he had prevented it in that prohibition, it would have definitely reached us; because it has the motive to transmit it. Therefore, in the validity of this way, the non-prohibition is sufficient, and the possibility of the need for signature and the insufficiency of the prohibition is weak and it is not taken into account, unless the signature is absolute consent, even a discovery of the will not to prevent, which would be a verbal dispute.

Some are of the opinion that the construction of the intellect is an argument only when it is discovered from it, based on certainty, that the lawgiver agrees and signs with their method, and this discovery is possible only if there is no obstacle to the unity of the lawgiver's doctrine with the intellect in the construction and conduct, and then, as soon as there is no proof of the prohibition of the construction of the intellect, the unity of the lawgiver's doctrine with them becomes clear and evident; because the lawgiver is the head of the intellect, and if he had another doctrine, he would have explained and defined it. If there is an obstacle to the unity of the lawgiver's doctrine with the intellect, then it is necessary to prove the current practice of the practice of the intellect, even in matters of Sharia, in the presence of the lawgiver. In this case, if the prohibition on the part of the lawgiver is not proven, his silence is like a statement of the practice of the intellect. If the two previous conditions are eliminated, the realization of a specific rational reason for the lawgiver's consent and sign with the practice of the intellect is necessary.

4) Conclusion

In any case, in terms of the results of the discussion, the Seerah sometimes stands in the position of discovering the general divine ruling, the use of which is dependent on its contemporaneity with the Infallible Imam (a.s.), and sometimes stands in the position of clarifying the subject of the religious ruling, and sometimes it refines our understanding of the reason.

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