The free will defense is a widely accepted response to the problem of moral evil, endorsed by many philosophers of religion. Alvin Plantinga, in contemporary times, reinforced this defense and, with a technical formulation, deployed it against the logical problem of evil—particularly moral evil. Despite its positive role in addressing the logical problem of evil, when evaluated through the lens of Transcendent theosophy (Hikma muta‘aliya), several of the presuppositions, foundations, and implications of Plantinga’s formulation of the free will defense encounter serious philosophical challenges—challenges that render its acceptance problematic, even as a mere defense rather than a full theodicy. This inquiry, employing an analytical method, examines several of these presuppositions and implications. These include: a questionable interpretation of the human–God relationship, an incompatibilist approach to the relation between free will and causal determinism, the affirmation of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) as essential to the notion of freedom, the denial of divine freedom, and its failure to respond effectively to the evidential problem of evil.