Anselm’s Argument, one of the oldest arguments for the existence of God, has often been rejected by Muslim philosophers. Their primary reason for this rejection is the confusion between primary essential predication (al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī) and common technical predication (al-ḥaml al al-shāyeʿ). The core of their objection is that no concept can generate its instance; in other words, the mere presence of a concept does not entail its actual existence. However, a closer examination of Anselm’s reasoning for the supposed entailment between "conceiving of the greatest being" and "his actual existence" may render this objection invalid. According to Anselm, the aforementioned principle has a unique exception—specifically, when existence is included within the very concept itself. Muslim philosophers neither critique Anselm’s justification for this exception nor engage directly with the content of his claim; rather, they simply merely deny Anselm's claim. Kant, on the other hand, addresses Anselm’s rationale for this exception. From Kant’s perspective, Anselm's exception lies in treating existence as a predicate that describes external objects—an idea that Kant explicitly rejects.